Both diplomacy and deterrence have failed: How the Gulf states are responding to Iranian counterattacks, not only considering red lines but also questioning US hegemony in the region.
Are the Arab Gulf states on the brink of war? In the midst of a conflagration? This is a framing that the rulers of the Arab states want to prevent. And yet it describes reality. Iran's retaliatory strikes are already having long-term effects and indirectly strengthening a body that has lost relevance in recent years: the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC).
It was foreseeable that the Gulf states would be drawn into war in the event of a US-Israeli attack on the Iranian regime. But the extent of Iran´s retaliation was surprising nonetheless. On Saturday alone, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) intercepted 170 missiles and almost 600 drones. The small country Kuwait intercepted almost half that number. Qatar and Bahrain on the other hand got off lightly in comparison – even though they are of utmost military value to the US Army: Qatar is hosting the regional command facility CENTCOM and Manama is the seat of the US Navy's 5th Fleet. The two countries together have intercepted around 100 guided missiles and drones. The situation for Saudi Arabia is unclear: the kingdom has not yet released any official statements with corresponding figures, but is just as affected as its neighboring states. On the same day, Israel intercepted around 100 drones and missiles directed at the Holy Land.
In the Gulf, Iranian attacks are primarily targeting US military bases rather than civilian facilities. This was announced by Ali Larijani, secretary of the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) who by now is probably the most important power broker in Iran since Ali Khamenei's death. Even after the attacks on the Saudi oil field Ras Tanura, Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Majid Takht-Ravanchi assured that Iran was not responsible – "and that the government informed our brothers in the kingdom of this."
State-owned company QatarEnergy has also put the production of petrochemical products on hold until further notice
However, Tehran's fraternal rhetoric is barely well-received in the Gulf. The damage to civilian infrastructure is too great. At the same time, there is a feeling of betrayal: after all, some Arab Gulf states had urged Washington not to take military action against Iran. So what explains Iran's strategy of targeting its neighbors in particular in its military response? For some military analysts, the reason is that the Iranian regime was unable to rebuild its medium-range missile capabilities after the Twelve-Day War, unlike its short-range missiles, which are now being fired at the Gulf states.
Others point to Iran's political strategy: perhaps Tehran still hopes to bring the Gulf states to their knees through economic pressure and convince Donald Trump to back down. A controversial report by Bloomberg claims that this is already happening, and that the UAE and Qatar are already lobbying Trump to end the war early.
The costs for the Arab states are enormous: the airspace above the world's largest airports is closed, malls are empty, and prestigious buildings such as the Burj Khalifa have been evacuated. But that is the least of their worries. Worse are the direct attacks on airports, including those in Dubai, Abu Dhabi, and Kuwait City, and above all the attacks on critical energy infrastructure—the backbone of the Arab Gulf states. Qatar, for example, had to shut down the world's largest liquefied natural gas production facility and freeze gas exports. This affects not only the main customers in Asia, but also Germany, for example. The state-owned company QatarEnergy has also put the production of petrochemical products on hold until further notice.
The Gulf rulers face a dilemma: they must not appear weak towards Iran, yet they are also disappointed with US involvement
Saudi Aramco has been forced to suspend operations at its Ras Tanura refinery, the kingdom's largest production facility. And the Strait of Hormuz is de-facto blocked, where usually around 20 percent of global oil production passes through this bottleneck south of the Persian Gulf. On Sunday, Tehran also attacked the port of Duqm in Oman. Maybe a cynical cadeau for the fact that the US and Iran held a supposedly successful joint meeting in Geneva under Omani auspices last Thursday.
All of these attacks showcase, as Saudi analyst Aziz Alghashian puts it, "that too many red lines have been crossed." The mood in the Gulf is as follows: they did their utmost to prevent this war and are now paying the highest price. Even though there is no talk yet of joint retaliatory strikes against Iran, the Gulf states will have to act. In the final statement of the Gulf Cooperation Council that convened on Sunday in an online setting, the countries “reserve the right to do so”. Similar are the words of Majed Al-Ansari, spokesman for the Qatari Foreign Ministry, who explained to CNN that diplomacy is over: "We are currently not in contact with Iran”, he explains. At the same time, he made it clear that the Iranian attacks cannot go unanswered.
The Gulf rulers thus face a dilemma: they must not appear weak towards Iran, yet they are also disappointed with US involvement. So far, the GCC countries have acted united. Indeed, closer cooperation may be one of the long-term effects of the impending war. Analysts in the Gulf are already discussing the need for greater interoperability and security coordination, as well as increased intelligence service collaboration and a strengthened Gulf Cooperation Council to oversee these efforts. Diversifying arms imports is also on the agenda, especially since over half of current arms deliveries come from the US – political leverage could easily be used against the interests of the Gulf states. While Israeli and US politicians and military leaders are praising the Gulf states as 'champions of the hour', the Gulf states will be looking for new partners in future – albeit begrudgingly.
