Selectivity and asymmetries of power have accompanied international law since its inception. From a German perspective, this issue takes on particular significance, especially in the midst of the war with Iran and the naval blockade of the Strait of Hormuz.
It is striking that, following the outbreak of the Israel-U.S. war against Iran, public opinion in Germany began almost mantra-like to revolve around international law. Journalists, scholars, and politicians offered analyses and assessments repeatedly emphasizing that this war violates international law and must therefore under no circumstances be supported. Even silence or a wait-and-see approach was, by some voices, already deemed problematic, as though international law were a kind of normative revelation, the very existence of which constitutes a fundamental precondition for the survival of human civilization.
There is no denying that a rules-based international order can offer significant advantages, provided that such an order has ever truly existed in the history of international relations. At the same time, one might argue that the recurring violations of international law paradoxically serve as evidence of its existence. Such interpretive patterns strongly shape political, social, and media discourse in Germany, particularly when one considers how the current war against Iran is being debated publicly.
A similar line of argument was already observable four years ago, when Russia invaded Ukraine. The public outcry at that time was even more intense. Central principles of international law were repeatedly emphasized: borders must not be changed by force; international law constitutes a fundamental basis for the existence of the German state and the European order. In more pointed formulations, this line of reasoning led to the perception that Germany’s support for Ukraine served primarily to defend international law itself.
This stance is hardly surprising when one considers the close connection between Germany’s constitutional order and the international legal order. The discourse oriented toward international law repeatedly highlights that modern Germany is, in a sense, a product of the postwar legal order. The founding of the United Nations occurred in the context of the catastrophe of the Second World War, and modern Germany subsequently developed within this new international framework, becoming fully integrated into it through its admission to the United Nations.
Earlier U.S. administrations, however, at least frequently attempted to legitimize their actions under international law or to frame them accordingly.
Yet a war remains a war - regardless of whether military actions comply with international law. Armed conflicts have by no means diminished in the 20th and 21st centuries; in many respects, they have multiplied. In this context, the war against Iran does not appear as a historically singular event. Confrontations between Iran, Israel, and the United States have already occurred in recent years, including missile and drone attacks as well as other forms of military escalation.
The particularly strong reaction of the German public to Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine can also be understood against the background of the historical relationship between Germany and Russia. Moscow was long perceived in German public discourse less as an equal political partner and more as an energy supplier and geopolitical factor.
By contrast, the current intensity of discourse on international law in connection with the war against Iran points to a different dynamic: a growing irritation with how the United States - especially under President Donald Trump - handles international norms. This irritation was evident, for example, in reactions to statements by the German Chancellor, who had not clearly labelled the war as a violation of international law. His conduct during talks with Donald Trump in Washington was likewise met in parts of the German media landscape with ridicule and criticism.
It is no secret that Trump and his administration attach only limited importance to international law. A normatively structured international order appears to be of secondary relevance to the United States, raising the question of whether such an order has ever been a central concern of American foreign policy. In practice, the United States has repeatedly expanded its international position through military interventions, economic pressure, and political influence. Earlier administrations at least often attempted to justify their actions in legal terms. The current administration, by contrast, seems to rely more explicitly on the principle of factual power, deriving from it the authority to define the rules of international relations.
Germany thus finds itself confronted with an international reality in which normative expectations and power-political practices diverge.
The belief in military power as the primary organizing principle of international politics had already sparked controversial debates in Germany prior to the current war - for example, in connection with Venezuela and the handling of President Nicolás Maduro. At the same time, confidence in the role of the United States within NATO and as Germany’s protective power appears to be eroding in parts of the German public. The strong reactions to U.S. military actions can also be explained by the assumption that the United States is willing to use military force to pursue its own interests, while its willingness to defend Germany militarily in an emergency - or even to fulfil its NATO obligations - appears less certain.
This perception gives rise to an image of a fragmented international order. From this perspective, it seems contradictory that the United States, as a superpower, conducts military interventions perceived as violations of international law, while at the same time potentially hesitating to act militarily in situations of clearly lawful collective defence. Germany is thus confronted with a reality in which normative expectations and power politics diverge.
Against this backdrop, the recourse to international law in German discourse appears as an attempt to preserve normative stability in an increasingly fragmented world order. References to legal norms function as moral and political points of orientation in a system increasingly shaped by power politics and strategic interests.
At the same time, the fundamental question arises whether international law is actually capable of protecting Germany from a military attack. Can a system of norms and treaties effectively deter a potential aggressor from using military force? A similar question can be posed domestically: has criminal law ever completely prevented individuals from committing acts of violence? Criminal law typically operates after the fact, through deterrence or punishment, it cannot prevent a determined actor from committing a violent act.
Norms and rules may provide orientation and generate political legitimacy, but the fundamental prerequisite of state security remains the capacity for self-defence.
Applied to international law, this logic leads to a sobering conclusion: a state with sufficient military capabilities and the willingness to use them can ignore international legal norms. The deterrent effect of international law is therefore limited and selective. This is not merely a feature of the current international order, selectivity and asymmetries of power have accompanied international law since its very inception.
From a German perspective, this problem takes on particular importance because confidence in the U.S. security umbrella - the central guarantor of both German and European security - is increasingly being called into question. This creates a paradoxical situation: German political, academic, and media discourse frequently criticizes U.S. military actions as violations of international law. At the same time, there is an awareness that international law alone offers no effective protection against military aggression. Yet it is equally clear that, due to its military capabilities, the United States remains the only actor capable of effectively defending Germany and other NATO states in an emergency, whether through deterrence or direct intervention.
Against this background, it appears problematic to apply a purely normative legal standard to the United States. The decisive question for American security guarantees is less whether a military conflict can be justified under international law, and more whether Germany holds sufficient strategic, political, military, and economic significance for the United States.
Thus, a classic constant of international politics remains: security rests less on normative orders than, first and foremost, on a state’s own military strength, and only secondarily on stable alliances. Norms and rules may provide orientation and legitimacy, but the fundamental condition of state security remains the capacity for self-defence.
In parts of the political debate in Germany and Europe, the naval blockade of the Strait of Hormuz is now also being discussed as an independent violation of international law.
Within alliances, this raises a central question: to what extent can they be structured so that their members are truly willing to stand by one another in times of crisis? Ultimately, the credibility of an alliance depends on whether its members are prepared, at the decisive moment, to bear the political costs and risks of collective defence, even when this requires the use of military force.
This question is becoming more urgent by the day, particularly in light of Trump’s explicit calls for other states to deploy warships to escort commercial vessels and oil tankers through the Strait of Hormuz. For Germany - as well as other NATO states and their specific relationship with the United States as a security guarantor - the underlying dilemma becomes clearer than ever: on the one hand, there is an expectation that the United States will provide comprehensive military protection; on the other hand, the prevailing view in German political, academic, and media discourse insists that Germany must under no circumstances participate in what are perceived as unlawful military actions by the United States and Israel against Iran.
Moreover, this dilemma becomes significantly more acute for political decision-makers when one considers that Germany and the member states of the European Union are heavily dependent on the Strait of Hormuz economically. A prolonged blockade could quickly escalate into an existential crisis. A combination of inflation, production disruptions, industrial shutdowns, and rising unemployment would directly threaten social stability as well as the political and institutional order. Even if such a scenario currently appears remote, it cannot be ruled out.
The controversy is further intensified by the fact that parts of the political debate in Germany and Europe now also frame the naval blockade of the Strait of Hormuz itself as a separate violation of international law, one that would be difficult, if not impossible, to justify under the right to self-defence. Under the prevailing legal interpretation, the situation thus involves a war that has in turn produced a legally problematic naval blockade.
There will be no “triumph” in a world that is both deeply interconnected and profoundly fragmented, assuming that any stable order remains at all after the war.
Politically and legally, a German Chancellor thus finds himself in a position of constraint: if he opts for military deployment in the Strait of Hormuz, he risks accusations of participating in an unlawful war, with reference, for example, to Article 26 of the German Basic Law. If he refrains, he exposes the state’s political, economic, and social fabric to significant risks. At the same time, his oath of office obliges him to avert harm from the German people and to promote their welfare.
Regardless of the direction taken, the decision appears wrong from one perspective or another. Nevertheless, the decision-making process can be structured into several analytical steps and criteria aimed at minimizing escalation caused by misperceptions or political misjudgements.
In political statements, negotiations, and public discourse, a strict distinction must be made between the U.S.-Israeli war against Iran and the naval blockade of the Strait of Hormuz. These are analytically and normatively distinct phenomena, particularly in political and legal scholarship.
On the basis of this distinction, Germany - together with its European partners - should develop an independent and coherent position on the question of the blockade. This is a moment for Europeans to act collectively. Such a position need not necessarily be military in nature. Rather, an intensive diplomatic phase appears necessary, combining mediation initiatives, political incentives, and credible threats.
In conclusion, it must be acknowledged that a considerable degree of uncertainty remains despite these considerations. One of the enduring - if sobering - lessons of the history of war is that, in the end, all sides lose. Nevertheless, it remains imperative to do everything possible to limit the damage and to bring hostilities to an end as quickly as possible. A purely legal debate over responsibility and evaluation contributes little to resolving the crisis when the international order as a whole stands on the brink of collapse. Under such conditions, the question of who started the conflict recedes into the background. There will be no “triumph” in a world that is at once tightly interconnected and deeply fragmented, assuming that any form of stable order survives the end of the war at all.
