Politics and society must find a new formula to successfully shape Syria’s postwar order. A plea for a three-point plan that addresses the true evil of the Assad regime at its root.
It is easy to claim that much of what is currently happening in Syria is either ad hoc, spontaneous, or without plan or rationale. On the other hand, one could just as well argue that everything happening in this country follows a conspiracy by the currently ruling forces around Ahmad Al-Scharaa, by international or regional actors or alliances - be it the United States and Israel, Turkey and the Gulf states, or Russia and Iran. Both ways of thinking have a decisive advantage for the individual Syrian: they generate a high degree of comfort. This comfort is reflected, among other things, in the fact that many blindly trust that President Al-Sharaa and his new administration will somehow solve the problems, and that the United States and President Trump alone are capable of advancing Syria politically, militarily, and economically.
Out of the simplification of such argumentative patterns, two camps have essentially emerged among Syrians, which in terms of their composition and the nature of the discussions conducted resemble a déjà vu of the Assad era - albeit in reversed form. While the majority of Arab Sunnis belong to the camp of those who place unconditional trust in Al-Sharaa and his administration, most so-called religious, confessional, and ethnic minorities view the new Syrian administration with scepticism, deep scepticism, or even complete hopelessness. At the same time, individual voices can also be heard among Syrian Arab Sunnis who criticize state actions in several matters as ad hoc and lacking planning. Some of them even view Al-Sharaa and his administration with extreme scepticism. Conversely, there are also voices among the so-called minorities that fully support Al-Sharaa.
According to many Syrians across these camps, nearly all problematic or stalled developments in Syria have their cause in the country’s desolate condition and in the almost complete destruction of all state and societal structures by the Assad regime. Against this backdrop, the current difficulties in the work of the Syrian administration are largely perceived as normal and understandable.
Due this background, the question arises as to how Syrians can be brought together into a unified national camp, or whether it is even possible to form such a camp in a country like Syria. This is explicitly not about questioning the legitimate existence of political and social opposition to the government, but rather about promoting broad acceptance of the differing views of all Syrians.
The various perspectives should therefore be understood as puzzle pieces of a large pool of opinions. In other words, it is time to overcome the perception that affiliation with a political camp is inseparably linked to the existence of a social group, a problematic legacy of the Assad era. For years, the Assad regime was only able to control the centrifugal forces of an extremely heterogeneous Syrian society by embedding in each individual social group the feeling that its existence was permanently threatened by the other groups.
It must become normal for Syrians - regardless of their social affiliation - to be able to criticize President Al-Sharaa and his administration
Nevertheless, many Syrians - even under the circumstances described and within the current atmosphere of debate - advocate negotiating a social contract among Syrians now and without delay, drafting a permanent constitution, or at least initiating dialogue processes toward these goals. However, the current situation first requires certain preparatory steps aimed at establishing a minimum level of rationality in Syrian discourse. In this context, rationality consists in reducing or completely eliminating real or imagined threat scenarios between social groups. The sense of threat felt by each individual group must be transformed through rational action into a shared sense of belonging.
Overall, it would be necessary to develop a master plan for this purpose, built up step by step. It is not solely the task of the new Syrian administration to develop and implement such a plan; rather, all social groups must participate and contribute their respective imprints. In other words, it is the shared responsibility of politics and society to decide in which direction Syria’s social substrate should be steered. Nevertheless, in this chaotic phase of state re-formation, one must not expect complete harmony among all social elements, but initially merely the willingness to recognize all the narratives, concerns, and fears mentioned as collectively Syrian and to treat them on the same level.
This is explicitly not a legal question. It is therefore not about codifying corresponding regulations in a decree or ordinance, but rather about a joint commitment by politics and society that should be reflected comprehensively at the programmatic level. The master plan would therefore have to represent a step-by-step program that essentially includes the following points:
First: The mentality of fear toward the “Other” that prevailed under the Assad regime must be actively rejected both in the media and by religious and social authorities. At the same time, a culture of dissent should be promoted. In other words, it must become normal for Syrians - regardless of their social affiliation - to criticize President Al-Sharaa and his administration.
Conspiracy theories must be actively refuted by political and social actors as well as by religious dignitaries
Criticism of the Syrian government by so-called Syrian minorities must not automatically be interpreted as high treason by the Sunni majority. Conversely, it should also be considered normal that the Sunni majority understands itself as the main bearer of Syria’s national project in the new phase after the fall of the Assad regime and develops new facets of a political and social order from this role. As long as legal and political guarantees for freedom and equality exist, other social groups must not see this as an existential threat.
Second: Conspiracy theories must be actively dismantled by political and social actors as well as by religious dignitaries - regardless of which camp they originate from or what content they have. One example is the belief held by some members of the Sunni majority that the nearly 14 years of suffering under the Assad regime were part of a deliberate conspiracy against Syrian Sunnis. In their view, Bashar al-Assad could also have been removed from power - like Nicolás Maduro recently. Syrian Christians, in turn, often tend to assume that a conspiracy lies behind the continuous decline in their population numbers; currently, at most around 300,000 Christians live in Syria. Even if it seems difficult to completely eliminate conspiracy theories given the complex situation of all groups, they must nevertheless be countered with rational arguments by politics, society, and religious authorities.
Third: This working program should aim at the active participation of Syrians from all camps. All social groups must be willing to leave their respective comfort zones and seriously engage with the question of how Syrian society can develop a shared compass. It is not sufficient merely to reflect or discuss; rather, concrete steps toward active implementation must be undertaken.
Nevertheless, it must be soberly acknowledged that the process of forming a shared social substrate from diverse social groups is extremely complex. Ultimately, such a process can only be successful if societal forces voluntarily support it and accept its results. Coercion from above does not lead to sustainable outcomes in this context, but instead carries the risk of causing the centrifugal forces within society to explode. The three-point program outlined above therefore primarily aims to strengthen elements of voluntariness so that Syrian society itself can come together. If it finds its shared compass in this way and recognizes its direction, the conditions will be in place to begin dialogue and negotiations and to draft a viable social contract for the country.
