The end of the Autonomous Administration in Northeastern Syria follows the doctrine of stabilization through centralization. In this process, the transitional government of Ahmad Al-Sharaa can count on the backing of its neighbours and the United States.
During the margins of his European trip in early February, the Syrian foreign minister As'ad Al-Shaibani made two points clear in a meeting with representatives of the Syrian diaspora. First, the complete rejection of federalism and decentralization on Syrian territory, not only in political terms but also with regard to expanded administrative powers for local units. Second, the possible recognition of cultural and linguistic rights for all people living in Syria of different ethnic backgrounds. This principle was implemented through Decree No. 13/2026 concerning the rights of the Kurds.
Even though statements by a foreign minister typically remain vague and require further specification, they contain programmatic indications that cannot be separated from the development of a restructuring process toward a centralized Syrian state following the seizure of state power by militias surrounding Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and Ahmad Al-Sharaa. Such a process of centralization in Syria can only be understood when its international and regional dimensions are taken into account.
First of all, it cannot be denied that centralization and the concentration of state authority have been fundamental elements of the exercise of power throughout the history of the Syrian state. The emergence of a unified centre of power has always been linked to the strength of the ruler, or more precisely, to his understanding of strength. In the current era, “strength” is also defined internationally in accordance with the views of U.S. President Donald Trump, although other actors, including the European Union, promote their own concepts. In Trump’s perspective, strength is clearly connected to the historical notion of a dominant centre of power. It is also evident that domestically he has sought to concentrate state authority more strongly, at least at the federal level. But what does this have to do with Syria?
In the development of the Syrian state after 8 December 2024, the restructuring process of vertical state authority - viewed from an internal perspective - can be divided into several chronological stages.
Tom Barrack repeatedly emphasized the necessity of placing the entire Syrian territory under the control of the administration in Damascus.
Beginning with internal weakness and total fragmentation, and against the background of international uncertainty, the new Syrian administration initially acted cautiously in dealing with the structural diversification of the power structure. It issued administrative acts, conducted negotiations, and concluded agreements, for example with forces in Suweida or in the northeast. At the same time, it demonstrated strength primarily in the Alawite regions along the coast. Regardless of the fight against forces of the former regime, these measures implicitly signalled opposition to any attempts to strengthen local or regional elements along the coast. At that time, the Syrian administration had also not yet obtained full recognition from the international community, particularly from the United States.
After President Ahmad Al-Sharaa’s trip to Riyadh and his meeting with Trump, considerations in Damascus about being able - or required - to control all of Syria in a unified manner gained new momentum. Recognition of the Syrian leadership by Washington marked the beginning of a new phase. Ahmad Al-Sharaa, whom Trump repeatedly described as a “strong man,” found himself in a new role. Similar to the thinking of Niccolò Machiavelli, the Syrian administration placed the unity of the three elements of the state and their strengthening at the centre of its political actions. This attitude was further reinforced by the fact that Tom Barrack - U.S. ambassador in Ankara and U.S. Special Envoy for Syria - repeatedly stressed the necessity of placing the entire Syrian territory under the control of the administration in Damascus.
Recognition by the American administration and the emphasis on territorial unity led Al-Sharaa to feel empowered to bring the entire Syrian territory under the control of the government in Damascus by all available means. The military operation in Suweida in July 2025 can be understood along this background as a direct implementation of this policy, regardless of the specific military or political confrontations between government forces and Druze groups. However, Israeli intervention prevented the full realization of this plan.
Decisive for the restructuring process was Al-Sharaa’s declaration that he intended to join the international coalition against ISIS.
After the events in Suweida and the withdrawal of government troops, a diplomatic marathon began under Barrack’s leadership. On 16 September 2025, the U.S. Special Envoy for Syria and Assad Al-Shaibani, with the participation of the Jordanian foreign minister Ayman Al-Safadi, reached an agreement to resolve the Suweida crisis. The agreement explicitly emphasized the unity of Syria and defined Suweida as an inseparable part of that unity. The document contained no references to federalism, decentralization, or local self-administration. In effect, it represented a roadmap for integrating Suweida into a centralized Syrian state.
In November 2025 Ahmad Al-Sharaa visited the United States and received considerable recognition from Trump for his strength and leadership style. Crucial to the restructuring process was his declaration that Syria intended to join the international coalition against the so-called Islamic State. This suggested that the special status of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) administration - particularly regarding responsibility for ISIS prisons - would lose importance from the perspective of the international community, especially the United States. By contrast, the administration in Damascus gained relevance as a potential bearer of this responsibility.
This factor - combined with the continued emphasis on Syria’s territorial unity by the U.S. special envoy - became the starting point for Damascus’s decision to gradually advance into areas of SDF administration in Aleppo in early 2026. With the military success in Aleppo, the process of reintegrating the northeast into the Syrian state system began. After military operations, negotiations, and political confrontations, the government in Damascus now controls large parts of the territories formerly held by the SDF, including the oil and gas fields. The agreement of 30 January 2026 between the government in Damascus and the SDF administration provides for the integration of SDF forces into four divisions of the Syrian army as well as government control over all civilian institutions and administrative structures. Here too, clear tendencies toward centralization are visible; references to political or administrative decentralization are absent.
Based on these developments, as well as the statements of Foreign Minister Shaibani and the U.S. administration, a guiding principle of the restructuring process can currently be identified: stabilization through centralization. This tendency also suits regional actors such as Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan, which are interested in stability along their external borders.
The United States supports Riyadh not only as the capital of Saudi Arabia but as the central interlocutor for the Gulf states. Similar dynamics apply to Cairo and Ankara.
Since the first term of Donald Trump, increasing tendencies toward centralization have been observable across the entire Middle Eastern region. The United States supports Riyadh not only as the capital of Saudi Arabia but also as the principal interlocutor for the Gulf states. Similar dynamics apply to Cairo and Ankara, each of which plays a decisive role in its regional environment, Cairo with regard to Gaza Strip and the Palestinian question, and Ankara, among other issues, in relation to the reorganization of northeastern Syria and, more broadly, the entire northern region of the country. Developments in Iraq likewise demonstrate the importance of a strong centre in Baghdad, when Prime Minister Muhammad Shia Al-Sudani managed to keep Iraq and Iraqi militias out of the rocket and drone confrontation between Iran and Israel (2024).
Overall, the centralization and concentration of power in Damascus cannot be separated from these international and regional trends. A temporary strengthening of the central authority appears to be a possible approach to overcoming the acute fragmentation and the dysfunctional exercise of state power across Syrian territory. Stabilization through centralization could therefore represent a method of consolidating state authority both vertically and horizontally, provided that principles such as neutrality, regional balance, and a clear temporal limitation to the transitional phase are respected.
Nevertheless, it remains unclear how the situation in Suweida will develop in light of Israel’s position and potential peace negotiations, and what a final settlement with the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in the northeast might look like. What is essential is a sober assessment of the overall situation in Syria under the prevailing circumstances. Whether through centralization, recognition of specific regional constellations, or an asymmetric distribution of administrative competencies between Damascus, the provinces, and the municipalities, every phase of transformation follows its own rules.
Programmatic signals in Syrian politics during such a phase are fluid and open to interpretation in different directions. A later decentralization through the strengthening of municipal competencies could be conceivable once the political, military, and economic situation stabilizes in accordance with the interests of the ruling authorities. However, a highly detailed and comprehensive central steering of the Syrian state cannot guarantee the long-term success of the public sector.
