Iran justifies its blockade of the Strait of Hormuz by invoking its own legal norms and is already preparing a new regulation intended to secure Tehran's maritime supremacy in the strait even after the war ends. However, the proposed legislation has more than one drawback.
The prospect of closing the Strait of Hormuz has long featured in Iranian strategic discourse, particularly among hardline factions within the political establishment. Following the outbreak of the war with the United States and Israel, this notion appears to have evolved from a largely rhetorical or contingency-based option into both a tactical consideration and a potential longer-term strategic instrument. If the “regionalization” of the conflict is conceptualized as a form of horizontal escalation, then actions targeting the Strait of Hormuz can be interpreted as a form of vertical escalation: an intensification of the conflict through the deliberate selection of targets, methods, and instruments designed to raise its strategic stakes.
In the period preceding the February escalation, and notably following the second round of Iran–U.S. talks in Geneva on February 16, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) Navy demonstrated this capability through a large-scale exercise titled “Smart Control of the Strait of Hormuz.” During the drill, the waterway was effectively closed to commercial traffic for several hours. According to IRGC Navy commander Alireza Tangsiri—who was later killed during the course of the war—more than 80 oil tankers and commercial vessels transit the strait daily, and Iran maintains what he described as “24-hour comprehensive information dominance” over this critical maritime corridor.
Iran's Legal Approach to the Strait of Hormuz
From a legal perspective, Iran grounds its claims in the Act on the Marine Areas of the Islamic Republic of Iran in the Persian Gulf and the Oman Sea (1993), which frames the Strait of Hormuz as falling within its territorial jurisdiction. Article 1 asserts Iranian sovereignty over these maritime areas, extending not only to the waters themselves but also to the superjacent airspace, seabed, and subsoil. Article 2 defines the breadth of Iran’s territorial sea as 12 nautical miles from established baselines.
At the same time, the law formally recognizes the principle of “safe passage” under Article 5, permitting foreign vessels to transit Iranian territorial waters so long as their activities are not deemed prejudicial to the country’s order, security, or tranquility. Article 6 specifies a range of actions that would invalidate such passage, including the threat or use of force, military exercises, intelligence-gathering activities, the launch or recovery of aircraft, deliberate environmental pollution, and unauthorized fishing or research operations.
Crucially, Article 8 grants the Iranian government the authority to suspend passage in designated areas of its territorial sea on security grounds and in line with what it defines as the “supreme interests” of the state. Furthermore, Article 9 subjects the transit of foreign warships, submarines, nuclear-powered vessels, and research ships to prior authorization. Submarines, in particular, are required to navigate on the surface and display their national flag while transiting. This legal framework provides Tehran with a domestically codified basis to regulate, restrict, or temporarily suspend maritime movement in and around the Strait—an instrument that can be activated in times of heightened tension.
Legal Contestation and Strategic Instrumentalization of the Strait of Hormuz
It is evident that Iran’s interpretation of the law of the sea diverges significantly from that of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Under UNCLOS, the Strait of Hormuz is classified as an international strait, where the regime of “transit passage” applies. This grants vessels of all states the right to continuous and expeditious navigation, and crucially, coastal states—such as Iran and Oman—are not permitted to suspend or impede this right, even in times of armed conflict. While they may adopt regulations related to navigational safety or environmental protection, they cannot impose prior authorization requirements that would effectively restrict transit.
By contrast, Iran treats the strait as part of its territorial waters and asserts a right to enhanced supervision and control. Notably, Iran has not ratified UNCLOS and instead approaches maritime law through a hybrid framework combining domestic legislation, selective reference to customary international law, and a strongly security-oriented perspective. This approach affords Tehran a degree of strategic flexibility but has also been a recurring source of friction with neighboring states and maritime powers, particularly the United States. In this sense, Iran’s interpretation of the law of the sea can be characterized as unilateralist and interest-driven, prioritizing national security considerations even where these diverge from widely accepted international norms.
During the February conflict, Iranian officials framed disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz as a consequence of broader regional insecurity rather than a deliberate closure. Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi stated that the strait remained formally open, but that restrictions applied to vessels belonging to “enemy states” and their allies—those directly involved in hostilities against Iran—while others were free to transit, albeit often deterred by prevailing security risks. At the same time, Iranian authorities signaled that safe passage was, in practice, contingent upon engagement with Tehran. Several countries—including Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Japan, and India—reportedly entered into negotiations to secure transit assurances for their vessels.
This pattern reflects Iran’s broader effort to institutionalize a distinct doctrine governing the Strait of Hormuz—one that blends legal ambiguity with strategic signaling and conditional access. In doing so, Tehran seeks not only to manage a critical maritime chokepoint but also to leverage it as an instrument of geopolitical influence in times of crisis.
Toward a Post-War Regime: Iran’s Proposed Protocol for the Strait of Hormuz
According to Iranian officials, the post-war phase is expected to bring about the formulation of a “new protocol” for the Strait of Hormuz, to be developed in coordination with Oman, the state located on the opposite shore of the strait. The stated objective is to ensure the safe passage of vessels while introducing a set of defined regulatory conditions. Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi has emphasized that Iran must guarantee the long-term stability of maritime transit through the strait, albeit within a framework that reflects both national and regional interests. His remarks suggest that Tehran seeks not merely to restore pre-war arrangements, but to institutionalize a revised governance model in which passage is conditional upon compliance with newly defined rules—rules that, as Iranian officials indicate, would ultimately be shaped by Iran’s strategic preferences.
This position is echoed by Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, Speaker of the Islamic Consultative Assembly, who has argued that the legal and operational status of the strait cannot revert to its pre-war condition. In his view, the security environment has been fundamentally altered, necessitating a reconfiguration of both traffic management and legal arrangements governing the waterway.
In this context, Iran is reportedly advancing a legislative initiative titled the “Strategic Action Law for Peace and Endogenous and Sustainable Development in the Persian Gulf Region.” The proposal outlines a comprehensive framework structured around four core pillars: navigation security, environmental regulation through pollution levies, the collection of pilotage service fees, and the establishment of a regional development fund. Under this framework, the Iranian government—working in coordination with its armed forces—would assume an expanded operational role in managing transit through the strait. This includes the provision of pilotage services, inspection of vessels, enforcement of environmental standards, and, where deemed necessary, the authority to deny passage or detain vessels in cases of non-compliance. Vessels would also be required to demonstrate financial capacity to cover potential penalties, effectively introducing an additional layer of regulatory oversight.
The economic dimension of the proposal is equally significant. Iran’s Ministry of Roads and Urban Development is tasked with expanding maritime infrastructure across the Persian Gulf, including ports and islands, to support services such as bunkering. At the same time, pilotage fees would be structured in a manner that maintains the competitiveness of the Strait of Hormuz relative to alternative routes. A notable provision requires shipping companies or their insurers to maintain Rial-denominated accounts within Iranian financial institutions as a comdition for certification—an element that embeds financial leverage into the regulatory regime. The proposal further envisions the creation of a commercial platform for goods transiting the strait, as well as the possibility of joint ventures with “non-hostile” states, including Oman.
A central component of this initiative is the establishment of a “Persian Gulf Reconstruction and Development Fund,” intended to finance regional development and promote economic integration. While framed by Iranian authorities as a mechanism to foster solidarity and sustainable growth, the fund also incorporates a political dimension: investment by states designated as “hostile” would be contingent upon the prior payment of war reparations. Moreover, the broader framework envisages embedding reparations mechanisms into the conditions for ending the conflict.
Despite its internal coherence, the proposed protocol faces substantial legal and political challenges. Foremost among these is its tension with the international legal regime governing straits used for international navigation. Any attempt to impose conditional transit or prior authorization requirements would conflict with UNCLOS provisions on transit passage. Additionally, the Strait of Hormuz is a shared waterway between Iran and Oman, and any unilateral initiative risks resistance from Muscat. Unlike the the Bosporus and Dardanelles straits—governed by the Montreux Convention and controlled by a single state, Turkey—the Hormuz Strait lacks a comparable bilateral or multilateral treaty framework that would legitimize exclusive regulatory authority.
Oman’s position is particularly consequential in this regard. As a signatory to UNCLOS, Muscat is bound to uphold the convention’s provisions, which classify the Strait of Hormuz as an international strait and guarantee unimpeded transit passage. Oman has consistently aligned its domestic legal framework with these principles, reinforcing its commitment to the existing international order at sea.
Finally, even within Iran’s own legal framework, tensions emerge. The 1993 maritime law recognizes the principle of safe passage, albeit with restrictions for certain categories of vessels. The introduction of a new protocol imposing broader conditionalities would likely require either reinterpretation or suspension of existing legislation. Taken together, these factors suggest that while Iran’s proposal reflects an effort to translate wartime leverage into a durable post-war order, its implementation would depend on complex negotiations, legal adjustments, and the acquiescence—or at least tolerance—of other stakeholders.
Conclusion
From a broader strategic perspective, Tehran views its position along the Strait of Hormuz as a critical lever for reshaping the regional balance of power. By exerting control—whether through direct measures or by generating uncertainty—Iran can influence the calculations of states that remain heavily dependent on energy flows from the Persian Gulf. In this sense, geography is translated into political capacity: the more central the strait becomes to global risk assessments, the greater Iran’s potential bargaining power in both regional and international arenas.
Should conditions of instability persist, and the prospect of disruption in the strait become more acute, a recalibration of power dynamics is likely. Under such circumstances, Iran’s geopolitical weight would increase relative to the past, not necessarily through conventional military superiority, but through its capacity to affect a critical chokepoint of the global economy. This, in turn, could incentivize both regional and extra-regional actors to adopt more cautious, risk-averse approaches in their engagement with Tehran.
At the same time, Iran appears intent on translating wartime leverage into a more durable post-war order. The proposed protocol with Oman, supported by domestic legislative initiatives, signals an effort to institutionalize a model of conditional access to the strait. By introducing mechanisms such as prior authorization, service fees, and financial and security requirements, Tehran is advancing a sovereign, security-centered interpretation of maritime governance.
However, this approach faces structural constraints. Oman’s adherence to UNCLOS creates a legal counterweight that limits the feasibility of any unilateral or bilateral arrangement that contradicts international norms. Moreover, the strategic importance of the strait ensures that external powers—particularly major maritime and energy-importing states—will remain deeply invested in preserving freedom of navigation.
Whether Tehran can convert its geographic advantage into a widely accepted political order remains uncertain, and will depend on its ability to navigate legal contestation, regional diplomacy, and the broader balance of power at sea.
Hessam Habibi Doroh is a researcher at the Institute for Peace Support and Conflict Management (IFK) at the National Defence Academy in Vienna. Javad Heiran-Nia is the director of the Persian Gulf Studies Group at the Center for Scientific Research and Middle East Strategic Studies in Iran.
