Iran let the deadline pass, and the sanctions against Tehran's nuclear program are now back in effect. The consequences for the regime extend far beyond foreign and security policy—and are also sparking debate within Iranian society.
The 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), negotiated with the consensus of the UN Security Council’s five permanent members and Germany, marked a rare success in multilateral non-proliferation. Trump’s 2018 withdrawal reduced it to a legal shell, prompting Iran to scale back compliance and enrich uranium up to 60 percent. By September 2025, the IAEA reported Tehran’s stockpile at 441 kilograms of near-weapons-grade uranium.
Trump’s return to office in 2024 revived talk of a new deal, though under far harsher conditions. While he and envoy Steve Witkoff signalled some openness to compromise, hardliners pushed for military pressure, with Trump warning Ayatollah Khamenei in a direct letter that strikes could achieve what diplomacy might not. Negotiations began in April 2025 but collapsed after Israel’s June 13 attacks on Iran’s nuclear and military facilities—supported by U.S. strikes—that triggered a twelve-day war and hardened Tehran’s stance.
For Iran, the timing confirmed suspicions that the IAEA report provided a pretext for aggression. The absence of international condemnation deepened its disillusionment with the non-proliferation regime. In response, Tehran suspended cooperation with the IAEA, creating a decisive rupture that now complicates any future pathway back to negotiations.
After the 12-day war, Iran conditioned any resumption of talks with the U.S. on security guarantees and insisted on indirect dialogue. The European Troika (UK, France, Germany), however, tied the suspension of the snapback to three demands: direct U.S.–Iran talks, renewed IAEA cooperation, and disclosure of Iran’s remaining 60% uranium stockpile. Iran rejected these terms but entered a limited Cairo-mediated understanding with the IAEA. Europe deemed it insufficient, arguing that without a timetable, no reliable assessment of enrichment or damage from the June strikes was possible. On 28 August 2025, the Troika formally initiated the snapback mechanism at the UN Security Council, while a Russian-Chinese resolution to delay it failed due to Western opposition.
In response, Iran’s Supreme National Security Council suspended cooperation with the IAEA, though Tehran withheld formal notification to preserve space for side talks at the UN General Assembly. Proposals to dilute uranium to 20% and grant partial access were rejected by Washington, and negotiations in New York collapsed. President Masoud Pezeshkian later claimed an understanding with Europe was possible, but blamed U.S. insistence on full uranium handover for the breakdown. With the mechanism activated, Iran barred IAEA inspectors, while parliament codified the suspension of cooperation.
Fear and fatigue coexist with distraction and controlled relief, ensuring that social discontent remains diffuse even as the underlying sense of uncertainty deepens
The snapback also intensified domestic debates on Iran’s nuclear posture. Seventy-one MPs urged revision of the defense doctrine, distinguishing between the Supreme Leader’s 2011 fatwa prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons and the potential production of nuclear arms for deterrence. Parliamentarians publicly confirmed that withdrawal from the NPT was now under serious review, with legislative procedures reportedly complete. Although Ayatollah Khamenei declared talks with the U.S. “futile,” President Pezeshkian suggested negotiations could resume if sanctions were lifted—effectively setting conditions that maintain the stalemate.
The reactivation of the UN snapback mechanism—known in Persian as mekanism-e masheh literally “trigger mechanism”—carries a deep symbolic weight inside Iran. Much like a gun’s trigger, it evokes a sense of inevitability and fear: once pulled, the consequences unfold automatically. For many Iranians, this language reinforces the perception that the country is trapped in a cycle of coercion rather than compromise, where external pressure leaves little room for negotiation. The very term shapes public psychology, amplifying the feeling that their everyday lives are hostage to geopolitical confrontation.
On the ground, the snapback translates into heightened economic pressures—sharp inflationary jolts, currency depreciation, and a squeeze on households already reliant on informal markets. Families increasingly ration expenses, young people face limited employment prospects, and small businesses suffer from digital restrictions and periodic internet throttling. The state, meanwhile, relies on repression—expanded executions, targeted arrests of teachers, unionists, and minority activists—to keep unrest fragmented. Yet, in parallel, the authorities have adopted selective liberalization: loosening hijab enforcement in some settings, allowing concerts and leisure events, and signalling greater tolerance in cultural spaces. These openings are less concessions to social demand than calculated tools to diffuse anger and divert collective energies away from street protest.
The net result is a paradoxical social landscape. On one hand, Iranians face rising material hardship, shrinking trust in institutions, and mounting emigration aspirations. On the other, they are offered pockets of personal freedom and entertainment designed to absorb potential dissent. This dual strategy of repression and selective relaxation aims to stabilize the political system by managing, rather than resolving, grievances. In this sense, the mekanism-e masheh not only tightens the external contests on Iranian society but also triggers a domestic recalibration: fear and fatigue coexist with distraction and controlled relief, ensuring that social discontent remains diffuse even as the underlying sense of uncertainty deepens.
Can the state simply manage heightened pressure with its existing security doctrine or whether it must attempt to reshape its foreign policy and deterrence posture altogether?
The activation of the snapback has pushed Iran’s nuclear question into a new and more volatile phase. Relations with the West are now firmly framed through a lens of securitization, where negotiations are overshadowed by threats of force and coercive diplomacy. This shift will reinforce deep mistrust in Tehran, while in Western capitals it cements the view that pressure, rather than compromise, remains the primary tool.
Inside Iran, debates within the political system are likely to intensify. Hardliners point to the futility of engagement and raise the prospect of NPT withdrawal, while pragmatists argue for tactical flexibility to avoid economic collapse. This tension underscores a larger strategic dilemma: whether the state can simply manage heightened pressure with its existing security doctrine or whether it must attempt to reshape its foreign policy and deterrence posture altogether.
At the same time, the snapback amplifies Iran’s domestic contradictions. Economic hardship and repression coexist with selective liberalization—looser social controls on hijab, cultural spaces, and leisure activities—intended to diffuse public anger and stabilize the system. The challenge for the Iranian leadership is not only how to confront external threats, but also how to sustain legitimacy at home by managing, if not redefining, the delicate balance between control, concession, and survival in a society increasingly strained by uncertainty.
Symbolically, the trajectory from the JCPOA—translated in Iran as BARJAM, a term associated with FARJAM meaning a “good end”—to the mekanism-e masheh (“trigger”) captures the shift from hope to disillusionment. While officials stress that the snapback is an illegal mechanism and insist that support from Russia and China can mitigate the effects of renewed sanctions, it remains to be seen how the situation will evolve and which narrative—resistance, despair, or adaptation—will dominate the Iranian public sphere.
Hessam Habibi Doroh is a Trainee Scholar at the Institute for Peacekeeping and Conflict Management (IFK), National Defence Academy in Vienna. Javad Heiran-Nia is the director of the Persian Gulf Studies Group at the Center for Scientific Research and Middle East Strategic Studies in Iran.
