Is Ahmad al-Sharaa reshaping Syria according to personal discretion, or are his reforms oriented toward the common good? An examination of the judiciary, local administration, and state institutions provides some insight.
Since the fall of the regime, Syria’s state system has gained structure both institutionally and in terms of personnel. This development is, in itself, neither positive nor negative; rather, it should be understood as the factual emergence of new bodies and institutions. It is reflected most clearly in the constitutional declaration promulgated on 13 March 2025 and the associated founding documents from the same year - most notably the Declaration of Victory of 29 January and the final document of the National Dialogue Conference of 25 February. These texts form the legal basis for the appointment of Ahmad al-Sharaa as transitional president. On this basis, he appointed his ministers in the form of state secretaries. At least for the transitional period, the new constitutional order thus establishes a presidential system.
By contrast, the institutionalization of the legislative branch remains incomplete. Although the People’s Council - the parliament - was indirectly elected on 5 October 2025, it has not yet begun its work. Since his appointment in January 2025, the transitional president has therefore governed without effective constraints. The judiciary initially functioned only sluggishly and with varying degrees of efficiency across regions; many proceedings were postponed. By now, however, the courts appear to have resumed operations. Nevertheless, judgments are still issued only rarely, despite the availability of judges and the fact that the courts’ structures and jurisdictions have largely remained intact.
From the outset, the victorious Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) has asserted its influence over the judiciary by appointing one of its own representatives as head of each courthouse. In the initial phase, these positions were mostly filled by religious dignitaries. Over time, however, they were replaced by professional judges. These judges are tasked with overseeing court proceedings on the basis of religious norms. In practice, their intervention is usually limited to determining whether an investigation should be initiated or charges brought against an individual.
Judicial personnel have also undergone significant changes. Some judges - particularly those who had served at the Assad regime’s Anti-Terrorism Court - were dismissed. Judges who had previously been removed by the old regime because of their support for the revolution, by contrast, returned to their positions. Numerous posts were newly filled, not only at the courts of cassation and appeal but also within the public prosecution services and among investigating judges. At the same time, some judges remain formally employed within the judicial system but are no longer assigned new cases.
Since his appointment in January 2025, the transitional president has governed as the sole head of the executive.
The security services were dismantled and their personnel dismissed. The police forces, by contrast, were rebuilt. Gradually, some members of the former police were reinstated. In public administration, however, little has changed. Civil servants and public-sector employees were initially placed on compulsory leave but later, in most cases, returned to their posts. The most significant personnel changes within administrative offices concern leadership positions, which the new authorities have largely filled with loyalists. In addition, as in the judiciary, an overseer has been installed in almost every administrative body - typically an individual affiliated with or close to HTS.
Marked differences in personnel policy can be observed across ministries. Some departments have dismissed more employees than others. Beyond the security-related ministries of the interior and defence, this is particularly evident in the health sector, where the situation remains opaque. Decisions regarding dismissals or new appointments are only partially documented in writing.
It is clear that even under the previous regime, substantial irregularities in recruitment were widespread. Many individuals remain employed despite the absence of any actual need for their labour. This presents the new administration with a dilemma: on the one hand, dismissing employees is politically and socially difficult; on the other, continuing to employ personnel for whom there is no demand is equally problematic. Addressing this issue constitutes one of the central administrative challenges of the transitional period.
In summary, the new state system has developed its own internal dynamics at all levels. It is evident that constitutional and administrative-law structures, along with the processes of administrative and judicial institutionalization and their associated human resources, are closely interwoven, both structurally and procedurally.
With the capture of Damascus by HTS, a new chapter in Syria’s history has begun. The Assad regime, which for decades had been shaped by an Alawite power elite, was overthrown in favour of a Sunni movement ideologically influenced by jihadist Salafism. Alongside religious minorities such as Christians, Ismailis, and Druze, Sunnis had also been integrated into the Assad regime.
They contributed significantly to the system’s survival and economic stability. Nevertheless, from the outset it was clear that two principals were to guide the post-regime order: first, that Syria must never again be governed by a regime based on the domination of a minority; and second, that the Sunni majority society should henceforth dominate the state system.
This dominance is clearly reflected in the composition of the leadership circle surrounding Ahmad al-Sharaa, within the military, and across various bodies, such as the commission tasked with drafting the constitutional declaration and the two transitional cabinets of December 2024 and March 2025. Particularly striking is the dominance of a geographical alliance linking Idlib and Deir al-Zor in key leadership positions. This is closely connected to the origins of HTS, which emerged from the Nusra Front. The latter initially established itself in Deir al-Zor before later relocating to Idlib.
Syria’s bureaucracy also suffered profoundly under the Assad regime. Many qualified civil servants and public employees left the country. At the same time, persistent political and intelligence-service pressure hollowed out the state apparatus, stripping it of its function as an independent and neutral institution even before the regime’s collapse. This legacy made it nearly impossible for the new rulers to establish an efficient administration in the short term. The appointment of loyalists to senior positions further hampered bureaucratic effectiveness. As a result, much administrative expertise has been lost: experienced officials are either no longer in decision-making roles or deliberately refrain from active engagement to avoid conflicts with HTS-backed leadership structures.
Trade is based primarily on the flow of goods from the northern Syrian province of Idlib to other parts of the country.
It is noteworthy that an increasing number of administrative decisions lacking any legal basis are now being justified with religious or moral arguments - invoking concepts such as “faith,” “trust,” or “integrity.” As a result, public administration is losing its rational foundation and becoming susceptible to arbitrariness and decisions driven by personal loyalties. After nearly fourteen years of war, Syria is deeply fragmented geographically, socially, and politically.
When the Assad regime was overthrown in December 2024, the unity of the three fundamental elements of statehood - people, territory, and sovereign authority - had largely disintegrated. Today, substantial differences exist between regions. Idlib, for example, has developed in a manner entirely different from other parts of the country. The same applies to northeastern Syria, which is - until recently - under the control of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). Suweyda, too, has increasingly distanced itself from Damascus over the past four to five years, following attempts by the capital to force the southern region into submission through economic isolation.
Under the new rulers, this fragmentation has deepened further. In particular, the attacks carried out by security forces and militias against Druze communities in Suweyda in July 2025 have strengthened local aspirations for independence. Such events - along with the attacks on Alawite communities in March 2025 and the suicide bombing at the Greek Orthodox church in Damascus - have further widened already profound societal divides. At the same time, the government in Damascus has sought to ease tensions with the Kurds in northeastern Syria through the memorandum of understanding concluded on 10 March. The objective was to integrate SDF forces and their administrative structures into those of the new Syrian state.
However, negotiations between the SDF and the Syrian administration in Damascus have yielded no tangible results. Many meetings between the leadership of both sides ended without any concrete outcome. In the countryside around Aleppo, armed clashes between government forces and SDF units have instead become increasingly frequent. At the beginning of the year, following a shift in U.S. policy toward the SDF administration, the Syrian administration in Damascus launched military operations to regain control of several districts of Aleppo that had been under SDF control. These operations continued and ultimately resulted in the recapture of most areas previously controlled by the SDF.
In the end, the agreement of January 30, 2026 introduced new dynamics regarding territorial control and relations between the Syrian administration and the SDF. In practice, the SDF administration is to be integrated into the governmental system of the new rulers in Damascus from both administrative and military perspectives. The coming days will show how this agreement will ultimately be implemented.
Thus, the question arises whether the fragmentation of the state’s constituent elements - people and territory - will persist in some areas of northeastern Syria. Beyond this, the division is also evident in the third element of statehood: sovereign authority itself, although it is clear that the administration in Damascus is attempting to centralize power in its own hands. On Syrian territory, and apart from the new developments concerning the SDF administration, multiple separate power centres and competing forms of state authority have emerged. Since the takeover of power, this new phase of the Syrian state has been characterized by a high degree of ambiguity.
The new system thus stands between institutional consolidation and political self-definition.
From the outset, it was unclear what power structures governed the relationship between HTS and other militias - let alone who actually exercised leadership within this constellation. This question remains unresolved to this day, particularly in connection with the attacks on Alawite communities along the coast and on the Druze in Suweyda. There has been widespread uncertainty as to who within the new administration issued which orders, and why certain security forces and militias acted as they did, killing, raping, and looting.
Opacity also characterizes Syria’s private sector. Trade consists largely of shipments from the HTS-dominated province of Idlib to the rest of Syria, while it remains unclear who is involved and how transactions are concluded. At the same time, the cash economy has expanded dramatically since the regime change, as the new administration allows the exchange of foreign currencies without restrictions. Money can now be exchanged on virtually every street corner. Previously, this was impossible even in branches of the central bank, where the absence of foreign currency reserves was cited as the reason. Only later were private exchange offices permitted and licensed. Today, both street dealers and licensed exchange institutions are formally subject to state oversight, yet it remains unclear where the exchanged foreign currency ultimately ends up.
When such an inefficient state apparatus simultaneously presents itself as ideologically homogeneous, the weaknesses of such an order inevitably come to the fore. These phenomena, however, are typical of transitional phases and are frequently observed following the collapse of highly centralized regimes. The new system still faces the dual task of institutional consolidation and political self-definition.
In the meantime, the state has sought to conceal its weaknesses through displays of power. Examples include the violent excesses committed by individual units and allied militias in the coastal region in March 2025 and in Suweyda in July of the same year. All of this underscores an effort to stage and perform state strength. Even within the administration, this behaviour manifests itself in excessive bureaucratization: citizens are confronted with pointless documentation requirements, and even straightforward cases - such as the legal clarification of the status of former members of the security services who committed no wrongdoing - are unnecessarily complicated. Nevertheless, the state’s fundamental weakness remains evident. It cannot be concealed through authoritarian conduct; on the contrary, such conduct only renders it more visible.
Administrative decentralization could grant provinces and municipalities expanded competencies.
From the final phase of the Assad regime to the present, Syria’s state system has been shaped by contradictory structures and developments, all of which have come at the expense of the common good. It therefore appears necessary to replace Sunni dominance with broader societal and confessional participation in state institutions. Likewise, hegemonic practices of power must give way to responsible governance. A stable state must be robust, efficient, and transparent. Its decisions must be comprehensible, and its institutions predictable.
Syria’s territorial fragmentation continues to represent the central challenge to the state system and its three constitutive elements: people, territory, and sovereign authority. How the state handles the new situation in the northeast after the agreement of 30 January, the new realities in Suweyda, and developments in the Alawite coastal regions will have a lasting impact on the substance of the Syrian state, for better or for worse. The new administration therefore faces a fundamental question: whether it is time to rethink Syria’s inherited tradition of centralism. Far-reaching political decentralization - such as federalism or regionalism - appears difficult, costly, and politically unpopular in a country of this size. Syria is simply too small and too fragile to sustain a complex system of parallel legislative, executive, and judicial levels.
A realistic solution may lie in administrative decentralization, granting provinces and municipalities expanded administrative and financial powers without endangering state unity. The allocation of responsibilities and resources should be the subject of open negotiations among political actors. What is crucial is that these discussions take place in a pragmatic and objective atmosphere, allowing concrete models to be developed and tested for feasibility. Law No. 107 on Local Administration from 2011 could serve as a foundation for such negotiations.
At its core, this law seeks to overcome the pronounced centralism of Syria’s administrative system. It aims to clarify the division of responsibilities between the central government, provinces, and municipalities; to expand the powers of local bodies, particularly provincial and municipal councils; to strengthen public participation in local decision-making processes; and to improve the financial autonomy of territorial entities. In this way, the law could even provide the basis for a modern, balanced, and administratively decentralized system of governance in Syria.
Dr. Naseef Naeem is a scholar of public and constitutional law, a Fellow of the Candid Foundation, Director of Research at the Zenith Council, and author of The State and Its Foundations in the Arab Republics. (The German original of this article was published in print (zenith 2/25). It has been slightly modified here to reflect the new situation in Northeastern Syria, without changing the substance of the ideas presented in the original article)
