Why armed factions in northern Syria quietly applaud Erdoğan’s reelection – and why the Turkish president has a decision to make, as our author in Damascus points out.
When the electoral results were announced in Turkey, the armed Syrian factions, based in northern parts of Syria, fired their guns to celebrate the reelection of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. The celebratory gunfire is a scene that Syrians had long been accustomed to during the elections of Presidents Hafez and Bashar al-Assad. This time, however, the gunfire celebration is for the victory of one Assad’s opponents, namely Erdoğan. It is perhaps one of the few times in which the world witnesses people celebrating the victory of a foreign president, despite the strained relationship between their country Syria and that president’s country Turkey, and despite the 400 years of Ottoman occupation of Syria.
Erdoğan had a clear stance on the Syrian conflict since its beginning. Indeed, the Turkish policy of “zero problems” with neighboring states, which was considered the pillar of Turkish foreign policy, was apparently valid only in the absence of internal problems in these neighboring countries. With the start of the Syrian conflict, Turkey gradually transformed from a friend of the Syrian government to a friend of the Syrian rebels, and then to a military and logistical supporter of the armed factions, to end up with direct military intervention on Syrian territory, military actions against the Kurds and the establishment of military centers and checkpoints.
From here, armed Syrian military factions and Turkey began full coordination in all their affairs in northern Syria, whether military or economic, even in those areas under the control of the so-called Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (formerly al-Nusra Front), which has been trying to stay away from direct Turkish influence in a relationship that is still relatively opaque.
The common hostility towards the Kurds stems mainly from a shared security concern of growing Kurdish power
There is no doubt that the hostility to the Syrian regime was the common factor that brought together the interests of the two sides. Furthermore, the Russian intervention in Syria has increased the armed factions’ need for more logistical and material support, which Turkey secured, in addition to opening the door for foreign jihadists to join the factions in order to form a solid resistance against the regime and its allies.
The common hostility towards the Kurds stems mainly from a shared security concern of growing Kurdish power in the areas of the Autonomous Administration and the expansion towards the areas with a Kurdish majority. For Turkey, the Kurdish self-administration could be a prelude to the establishment of an autonomous entity, which may motivate the Kurds in Turkey to demand the same and seek to obtain political, cultural, and linguistic rights. As for the armed factions, there are several reasons for this hostility.
First, a difference in visions and goals. The Kurdish administration seeks to establish an independent entity that preserves the cultural and political rights of the Kurds and enjoys political and perhaps military independence from the Syrian state. The armed factions, on the other side, seek to establish an Islamic rule that will be the nucleus for establishing an Islamic state (whose models range from a state of an Islamic character like the Turkish model to a strictly Islamic state). Moreover, the Kurds and the various military factions seek to control the natural resources in the region. There are also regional interventions that established an Arab-Turkmen alliance against the Kurds, in addition to an existing competition over leadership.
The relationship between Turkey and the armed factions was based on two elements: First, the Syrian opposition military factions consider themselves in a state of alliance with the Turkish state, according to which most of these factions follow the strategic line decided by Turkey, especially regarding its foreign policy. Secondly, Turkey considers itself a guardian of the Syrian opposition military factions, and under this tutelage it does everything it can to finance and equip them, supervise the establishment of the economic structures necessary for their survival, represent them internationally and draft the necessary agreements to ensure their continuity and protection.
Erdoğan was keen to distance himself from the extremist HTS organization and from the suspicion that Turkey is its regional sponsor
Since his first appearance, Mouhamed Al-Jolani has shown a clear ability to distinguish himself and his organization from other armed formations and factions. He possesses military and administrative skills that have made the HTS the strongest and most reliable faction that does not seem to be under the control of the countries that finance it.
In his twenties, Al-Jolani was planting roadside bombs in Baquba, Mosul and Tikrit. Later, he reportedly became the representative of ISIS in Syria and then turned to a fierce fighter against it. Next, he became the representative of Al-Qaeda’s branch in Syria, then he completely distanced himself from the organization. He lived in anonymity for years to become at the age of 43 the first showman in northern Syria through his frequent public appearances, and his speeches in which he distances himself from al-Qaeda ideology, as if he is preparing himself for a new role in the areas that are outside the regime’s control.
After the announcement of Erdoğan’s victory in Turkey, it was noticed that the HTS faction was committed not to show joy or to participate in the celebration that prevailed in most regions of northern Syria, as if Al-Jolani wanted to reaffirm his independence from Erdoğan and stress his patriotism. Nevertheless, there is no doubt that he has a close relationship with Turkey, and that the two parties were keen to avoid announcing this.
Erdoğan was keen to distance himself from the extremist HTS organization and from the suspicion that Turkey is its regional sponsor, as this might put Turkey in a position where it has to offer explanations to its Western allies, especially the US, or to Russia, to which Al-Jolani did not hide his strong hostility.
Al-Jolani was keen to show his patriotism as he could use this image to play a role in the future of Syria
Al-Jolani was keen to show his patriotism as he could use this image of a patriotic leader to play a role in the future of Syria. He distanced himself from terrorist organizations and showed tolerance towards the Druze minority in villages under his control, visiting them and announcing that they have the same rights as the Sunnis. He inaugurated a Christian church in Idlib and invited the Christians who were displaced from Idlib to return. He fought and killed many leaders of other extremist foreign Islamic organizations. He also made more than one statement confirming that his organization is no longer considering any violent action against any of the European countries or the US.
Al-Jolani created a new image of himself as an experienced military leader and a principled politician that Western countries, especially the US, can trust to fight the Russian presence in Syria. Indeed he announced that he was behind the artillery shelling that killed Russian General Oleg Peshevisti, and this announcement can be read as another message to the US that he can be their man in Syria.
Perhaps the most prominent outcome of the bloody conflict in Syria was the re-emergence of hatred and divisions that everyone believed had been suppressed, or at least had been frozen. Certainly, the great speed in which sectarian manifestations emerged in the crisis confused the regime, as well as the opposition. It was not long before they began to benefit from sectarianism and even make it their favorite weapon.
The regions of northern Syria were no exception. They are home to three million Sunni refugees, who have their own stories of sectarian persecution they suffered in their towns and villages. In addition, three million Syrians with similar experiences crossed into Turkey. The participation of Hezbollah and Iran in the Syrian war and their support to the regime created the image of an Alawite Shiite alliance against the Sunnis.
The Turkish lira and the US dollar became the currencies of monetary circulation instead of the Syrian pound
Therefore, the opposition's military organizations, including the Free Syrian Army, who believed that the conflict in Syria is sectarian in nature, were naturally inclined towards Turkey, which is ruled by a man who built his success on political Sunnism. Thus, a relationship, based on the exchange of political benefits and a sectarian convergence, was established between the armed factions and Turkey.
This may be one of the logical explanations for the overwhelming wave of support for Erdoğan’s victory in the presidential elections against his rival, Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu. According to the armed factions’ perception, the prospect of a president of Alevi origin at the head of the Turkish state in the north, in addition to an Alawite president at the head of the Syrian state in the south (although the two are religious communities are quite distinct from another), amounted to a threat to Sunni military structures, and the gradual end of their role, especially in the absence of a traditional Sunni Arab sponsor.
Undoubtedly, Erdoğan’s opening of the Turkish borders for the Syrian refugees, especially at the beginning of the crisis, allowed him to perpetuate his image as a hero and savior for Syrians fleeing the war. In order to consolidate this image, it was necessary to take care of those who remained in the cities and villages of the north, especially as they requested his help through local mediators from military parties and organizations.
Accordingly, Erdoğan adopted an economic policy to gradually separate the economy of these areas from the areas under the influence of the Syrian regime and gradually linking them to the Turkish economy through a real “Turkification” process for services, raw and manufactured materials, as well as currency. The Turkish lira and the US dollar became the currencies of monetary circulation instead of the Syrian pound. All raw materials that Syrians need and cannot produce are imported from Turkey, from cement, to oil and most consumer goods.
The transit of goods through Turkish territory means implicit recognition of the so-called Salvation Government
The political differences in the areas under the influence of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham were neutralized in a way that indicates skillful economic-political pragmatism. For example, a large free-trade zone was established in Sarmada on the Turkish border. The transit of goods through Turkish territory means implicit recognition of the so-called Salvation Government that Jolani has formed, despite the existence of the interim government affiliated with the coalition, which enjoys international recognition.
This gradual “Turkification” of the economy in areas outside the control of the Syrian state aimed to link the entire north of Syria with Turkey politically and economically, the ultimate goal maybe creating a new Iskenderun district in the future. In fact, one of the biggest dilemmas that the Syrian state will face in the future, if it regains its influence over the areas in the north, will be to win back these residents, despite the deteriorating economic situation in regime-held areas.
Undoubtedly, such a headline would have sounded more interesting if the Turkish opposition had won. However, despite this, the shifts in Erdoğan’s discourse regarding the relationship with President Bashar al-Assad that preceded the Turkish elections, in addition to the change of practices against the Syrian refugees in Turkey, raises the question: Will the approach that Erdoğan started continue, or will there be no need for a radical political change in the foreseeable future?
The political division within Turkish society has become more evident after the elections, which may increase the tense discussions between different political groups on many internal issues, such as economic reforms and the size of the executive authority in the country, and external ones, on top of which comes the refugees’ crisis and the relationship with the armed Islamic organizations.
Erdoğan’s policy will continue to open up to the regime in Syria, albeit at a slower pace
This division may prompt Erdoğan to reconsider his policy, given that his popularity has declined in several constituencies, particularly in major cities, for various reasons, including the issue of Syrian refugees and their impact on the Turkish labor market, and the growing hostility towards them even among his supporters. Multiple economic challenges, including inflation, high interest rates, budget deficit and high unemployment rates force Erdoğan’s government to adopt policies aimed at achieving stability and promoting economic growth.
Erdoğan’s policy will continue to open up to the regime in Syria, albeit at a slower pace. It is expected that Erdoğan will take the initiative in the coming period to build a relationship with President Bashar al-Assad without compromising Turkish gains in northern Syria, foremost of which is the presence of military factions loyal to Turkey, as well as an economy directly linked to the Turkish market. Therefore, it is likely that Turkish policy will try to balance these problematic issues with the Syrian state to reach acceptable solutions.
Perhaps the political meetings between the Turkish and Syrian parties, which Russia is keen on continuing and expanding, seem helpful for the Turkish side, even if they do not lead to direct results, because they can be portrayed by the Turkish government to confirm its desire to play a positive role in resolving the refugees’ crisis and other issues. The discussions with Turkey indirectly endorse the Turkish military presence in the north, while Syrians reject giving Turkey any legitimacy or a representative status for the armed factions. However, Turkey can gain legitimacy, having endorsed the Syrian political opposition. Perhaps these are two contradictory logics that may not be easy to reconcile. There are, in my opinion, three main factors that can directly affect this issue.
Firstly, Turkey’s internal situation, especially the economic one, which is now imposing pressure on foreign policy, forcing Erdoğan to take painful decisions that affect the essence of the relationship with the fighting organizations there. The continuation of Arab reconciliation with Syria and the start of an economic move towards the reconstruction of destroyed infrastructure and the recovery of the Syrian economy will mean a lot to the Turks who are eager to find economic opportunities in Syria, which may push them to abandon their allies in the north or facilitate finding some solution, even at the cost of Turkish influence. Ultimately, the Russian-Ukrainian war and its repercussions, especially in the event of Russia’s defeat or a change in its governance structure, may open the doors to regional players, such as Turkey and Iran, to play larger roles in the region.
