In the war with Iran, the U.S. strategy seems to be either absent or backfiring. Is Washington perhaps sending a signal to China? Analysts within D.C.´s Foreign Policy Bubble differ
Three weeks in, a clear picture is emerging behind the U.S. decision to launch a war of aggression against Iran alongside Israel: Even though U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio claimed to journalists that the U.S. had been dragged into the war by Israel—the decision was a joint one. By Thursday of the previous week at the latest, according to the news portal Axios, “ the intelligence was solid, and diplomacy was dead.“ On Saturday, February 28, Ali Khamenei and the country’s top leaders were to gather at the Supreme Leader’s residence, where they could be eliminated in one fell swoop.
The objective behind this was not specified, but oscillates somewhere between the nuclear issue, the Iranian missile program, and regime change. If one is to believe Omani Foreign Minister Badr Al-Busaidi, but also British security adviser Jonathan Powell, the nuclear negotiations could hardly have been the primary reason: following the talks in Geneva, Iran was prepared to make concessions that went far beyond the JCPOA. But also regime change was off the table after February 28. Yet in January Trump announced that „help was on the way“ to the Iranian protesters. However, these words quickly fizzled out amid the shrapnel of war. By now, even Netanyahu expressed that the Iranian regime may survive.
For analyst Zineb Riboua of the Washington-based Hudson Institute, this is about something bigger than the burning streets of Tehran. In her analysis, she portrays the new Gulf War as a prelude to a showdown with China. Or as she puts it: “Every year the U.S. spends trying to keep Tehran in check is a year gained for China to build control in the Pacific.” This line of reasoning is not new.
Even under Barack Obama, Iran and the Indo-Pacific were indirectly linked in foreign policy. The American “Pivot to Asia” primarily referred to the military withdrawal from Iraq and Afghanistan. At the same time, Washington was aware of what the then-EU High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy, Javier Solana, and former NATO Secretary General had already pointed out in 2012: „The Middle East has kept the US bogged down for decades. But ut if the dispute with Iran is resolved diplomatically, the Middle East might, perhaps, be relegated to a position of lesser importance“, as he explained in the magazine Project Syndicate.
According to Riboua´s logic, neutralizing Iran’s missile program now means preemptively limiting the strategic adversary’s room for maneuver in the event of a trade war.
After Trump’s first move into the White House, the U.S. unilaterally withdrew from the JCPOA in 2017. Instead of diplomacy, Washington pursued a strategy of “maximum pressure”—and aimed for a deal that encompassed not only Iran’s missile program but also Tehran’s foreign policy, particularly the allies of the “Axis of Resistance.” A benchmark that was unacceptable to the Iranian regime, as it can not truly exert deterrence withoutt its paramilitary allies. Although Israel has severely weakened Iran’s proxies militarily in the aftermath of October 7th, they remain a vital part of Iran’s security architecture.
The strategic dilemma between the geopolitical regions of the Middle East and the Indo-Pacific has hardly changed since 2011. But the calculushas shifted all the more: an agreement with Iran failed not least due to domestic political considerations in the U.S., and the Iranian leadership was not swayed by a policy of harsh sanctions. Instead, Tehran let its citizens bleed. What occurred on February 28 is, within this logic, the continuation of politics by other means. Inspired by the Israelis’ capabilities and intelligence, and spurred on by the flash success of the special operation in Venezuela.
For Zineb Riboua, the new Gulf War is a test of whether, in the event of a war between the U.S. and China, the U.S. military can gain control of the sea lanes in the Persian Gulf. About half of China’s total oil imports—from Saudi Arabia, Iraq, the UAE, and Iran—must pass through the strait. According to this logic, neutralizing Iran’s missile program now means preemptively limiting the strategic adversary’s room for maneuver in the event of a global trade war.
A closer look at the figures, however, also reveals that the dependency is actually much greater in the opposite direction: While only 12 percent of China’s oil imports come from Iran, exports to China account for more than 80 percent of Iran’s export volume. This is nevertheless advantageous: The People’s Republic purchases Iranian oil at a discount of up to $10 per barrel—every day, tankers transport 1.2 million barrels via the Strait of Hormuz and the Strait of Malacca to China.
Jonathan Fulton of the Atlantic Council think tank interprets the strategic context in a similar way. “The U.S. will not shift its focus to Asia as long as Iran continues to cause problems in the Middle East,” the political scientist explained in early March on the China Global Podcast. However, unlike Riboua, he characterizes Iranian-Chinese relations as structurally dysfunctional: More than the implementation of the agreed-upon strategic partnerships (2021, 2025), Beijing is primarily concerned with sending a signal to the U.S. itself. According to Fulton, the People’s Republic also views Iran’s allies as a disruptive factor to regional stability, upon which Chinese foreign policy is based.
Riboua, on the other hand, points to the Red Sea, where, as she argues, China is quite willing to contribute to regional instability. The American-Yemeni analyst Fatima Abo Alasrar made this argument as early as last spring: According to her report, the Houthi political leadership had coordinated directly with Beijing when they announced they would not fire on Chinese merchant ships.
Very few analysts in Washington actually conclude that the U.S. attacked Iran because of China
Very few analysts in Washington conclude that the U.S. attacked Iran because of China, even though a strategic link certainly exists. While analyses such as Zineb Riboua’s are not to be dismissed on their merits, they nevertheless go too far, as demonstrated by U.S. strategy towards China. The military goal is certainly not to eliminate the Iranian capacities before heading to China. This becomes most clear, when looking at the US general strategy towards the US. Rather than military confrontation, the goal is to 'avoid perpetual confrontation', as US Under Secretary of State Elbridge Colby explained in Seoul in January. As written in the 'National Defense Strategy' published that same month, the US seeks to foster 'respectful relations' with China.
And despite the war with Iran, Washington continues to pursue precisely this policy: The U.S. government now intends to postpone the meeting between Xi Jinping and Donald Trump, originally scheduled for late March, by one month. The first round of preparatory talks was already successfully held in Paris on Sunday. The postponement was likely not due to a rift with China. Rather, the U.S. government wants to have the issue of the Gulf War resolved by then.
